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8.1  Introduction 
Given the success with which tariff reductions have been negotiated during 
the postwar period, it is not surprising that the rules which govern the excep- 
tions from the negotiated tariff bindings have replaced the tariff bindings them- 
selves as the central  focus of  international cooperation  in trade policy. No- 
where is this change in emphasis more apparent than  in  the rising  friction 
associated with antidumping law. Accusations that foreign firms are “dump- 
ing” products onto the domestic market and the belief that dumping is injurious 
to the domestic industry are by no means new.’ Almost eighty years ago, such 
accusations and beliefs  led the United  States to adopt its first antidumping 
legislation, as contained  in  sections 800-801  of  the Revenue Act  of  1916. 
While the original intent of the law was to protect U.S. firms from the “unfair 
competition” implied by the alleged dumping practices of the highly cartelized 
and heavily protected German industries of the period (see Viner 1966, 242), 
antidumping law today seems to elicit a much broader usage.* 
With the use and abuse of antidumping law now regularly a central concern 
of both multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations, it is especially important 
to have as full an understanding as possible of the impact of existing antidump- 
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1. Dumping is defined as exporting products to the domestic market at export prices “below fair 
value,” that is, either below the prices of comparable products for sale in the domestic market of 
the exporting country or below costs of production. 
2. This broadening usage was in part facilitated by  explicit changes in U.S. antidumping law. 
For example, under the original U.S. law, predatory intent had to be shown to establish a finding 
of  dumping. However, the Revenue Act of  1921 dropped the intent requirement. 
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ing laws on the free flow of trade, and of the uses to which antidumping law is 
put in practice. In this regard, several researchers have challenged the view 
that antidumping law restricts trade only when antidumping duties are actually 
imposed, arguing that the threat or even the mere possibility of duties can also 
affect import flows. Here we explore the differences across import sources of 
the uses and effects of antidumping law, accounting for both direct as well as 
possible indirect effects on imports and domestic import-competing output. 
In an earlier paper (Staiger and Wolak 1994) we studied three possible chan- 
nels through which these indirect effects might arise, which, we believe, when 
combined with the direct effects of duties capture most of the trade effects of 
antidumping law. We referred to these three nonduty effects as the “investigation 
effect,” the “suspension effect,” and the “withdrawal effect.” The first refers to 
the trade distortions associated with ongoing antidumping investigations, the 
second to the effects of “suspension agreements” (under which investigations 
are suspended in exchange for a promise by foreign firms to stop dumping), and 
the third to the effects of petitions that are withdrawn prior to a final determina- 
tion. Our empirical findings, which reflected data on the timing and outcome of 
every antidumping investigation that covered a manufacturing industry product 
in the United States between  1980 and 1985, indicated that the investigation 
and suspension effects are substantial. Specifically, we found that suspension 
agreements lead to trade restrictions similar in magnitude to what would have 
been expected if antidumping duties were imposed instead. We found that the 
effect of  a typical  antidumping investigation  is to reduce imports during the 
period of investigation by roughly half the reduction that could be expected if 
antidumping duties had been imposed from the beginning of the investigation. 
We found little evidence to support a significant withdrawal effect. 
Our focus on the broader trade effects of antidumping law also allowed us 
to consider the possibility that different firms might file antidumping petitions 
for different reasons. In particular,  we found evidence of two distinct filing 
strategies that appeared to coexist in the data, and we referred to firms as “out- 
come filers” or “process filers,” depending on which strategy they appeared to 
be using. Outcome filers are firms that file antidumping petitions in anticipa- 
tion of obtaining a finding of dumping and the relief that comes with it (either 
antidumping duties or a settlement agreement). Process filers are firms that file 
antidumping petitions not to obtain a dumping finding, but rather to obtain the 
effects that arise solely  from the investigation  process itself.  Our estimates 
suggested that while outcome filers are by far the dominant users of antidump- 
ing law, process filing was the likely strategy used by between 3 and 4 percent 
of the industries in our sample. 
In  the present paper we continue this line of research by looking for evi- 
dence of differences in the use and impacts of  U.S. antidumping law as it is 
applied to imports from different trading partners. As we discuss in  section 
8.2, whether an antidumping petition is initiated for process- or outcome-filing 
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but also on the characteristics of  the exporting country or countries against 
which the petition is filed. In our earlier work we allowed for the possibility 
that filing strategies might differ across U.S. industries, but we required firms 
in a given industry to pursue a common filing strategy against foreign imports, 
regardless of the country of origin. In this paper we allow the filing strategies 
of firms to be different for different import sources, but we impose the restric- 
tion that firms in  all U.S. industries pursue the  same overall filing strategy. 
Thus we consider the possibility that US.  firms may be outcome filers against 
imports from some countries and process filers against others. 
Using this method of analysis we are able to quantify significant differences 
in filing strategies used by U.S. industries against five sets of trading partner 
countries. We also are able to quantify the extent of import and domestic output 
distortions due to the various stages of the suit resolution process for each of 
these five sets of  trading partners. Finally, we are able to distinguish between 
regions  exporting to the  United  States that are primarily targets of process 
filings by U.S. industries, as well as those regions that are primarily targets of 
outcome filings by US. industries. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 8.2 describes our motiva- 
tion for including investigation,  suspension, and withdrawal effects with the 
duty effects when quantifying the impact of antidumping law on imports and 
domestic output. It then describes the different investigation effects expected 
under outcome- and process-filing  strategies. We  also discuss in this section 
why  some countries are more likely than  others to be  the target  of  process 
filing by U.S. firms. Section 8.3 then describes our empirical findings. Section 
8.4 concludes. 
8.2  U.S. Antidumping Law 
We begin by  making several observations concerning the practice  of anti- 
dumping law in the United States which may be helpful to keep in mind. First, 
there are two findings necessary for a determination of dumping: (1) sales of 
imports at less than fair value (LTFV), and (2)  material injury to the domestic 
industry due to these imports. One government agency is assigned to each of 
these determinations-the  International Trade Commission (ITC) determines 
injury to the domestic industry and the Commerce Department’s International 
Trade Administration (ITA) makes the LTFV determination. A second point to 
bear in mind is that for each of these decisions there is a preliminary and final 
decision made by each agency. The statutory time allotted for the entire investi- 
gation  ranges  from  ten  months  to  fourteen  months  under  special  circum- 
stances. Finally, except in “critical circumstances” (a condition described more 
fully below but in practice rarely met), a final determination of dumping will 
bring the retroactive  imposition of  antidumping duties on all imports of  the 
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preliminary LTFV finding, provided  that the preliminary LTFV finding was 
affirmative (as it was for 93 percent of the products whose investigations made 
it to this stage of the investigation process between 1980  and 1985). With these 
general points  in mind we now turn to a discussion of  the various potential 
trade distorting effects of antidumping law. 
8.2.1  The Trade Effects of Antidumping Law 
A simple view of the trade effects of antidumping law would hold that trade 
flows are affected by antidumping law only when a petition is filed, dumping 
is found, and antidumping duties are imposed. However, there are a number of 
reasons to believe that this simple view is inadequate and that many of the 
effects of antidumping law are indirect and subtle. We now describe three non- 
duty effects which, we believe, when combined with the effects of duties, cap- 
ture a major component of the possible trade effects of antidumping law. 
The Investigation Effect 
First, it is often claimed (see, for example, Dale 1980, 85-86  and U.S. Con- 
gress  1978, 12, 278) that imports are restricted during the period in which 
an antidumping investigation is taking place. There are two broad hypotheses 
concerning the reasons for and nature of this investigation effect. We refer to 
these two hypotheses as the “outcome-filer” hypothesis and the “process-filer’ 
hypothesis. According to the outcome-filer hypothesis, the investigation effect 
reflects actions taken by domestic importers and/or foreign exporters in antici- 
pation of the duties that would be imposed in the event of  a final affirmative 
dumping determination and that would be assessed retroactively back to the 
date of an affirmative preliminary LTFV determination. That is, as noted above, 
an affirmative preliminary  LTFV determination carries with it the liability of 
duty assessment for all imports entering thereafter if a final affirmative dump- 
ing determination is subsequently made. Consequently, a preliminary  finding 
of LTFV sales would be expected under this hypothesis to lead to a sharp drop 
in imports, with these trade-restricting effects lasting for the remainder of the 
investigation period, as long as the petition was perceived as having a reason- 
able chance of ending in a final dumping determination. 
In  addition to a drop in  imports coming  with  an affirmative preliminary 
LTFV  determination,  the outcome-filer hypothesis  carries with  it two addi- 
tional implications. First, in light of the possibility  of  an affirmative prelimi- 
nary  LTFV determination  and a subsequent falloff  in import flows, imports 
might, if anything, be expected to rise somewhat during the first months of the 
investigation in anticipation of this effect. In fact, evidently anticipating this 
possibility, U.S.  law provides for an assessment of “critical circumstances” un- 
der which duties can be imposed retroactively back to the date of filing if the 
filing of  a petition brings with it a significant import surge. For this reason, 
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investigation  under the outcome-filer hypothesis to be small. Second, under 
the outcome-filer hypothesis,  any petitions filed without regard to measures 
important for the final dumping determination would  be unlikely to exhibit 
strong investigation effects, since this hypothesis presumes a significant proba- 
bility of a final dumping determination and consequent duty imposition. It is 
for this reason that we refer to this hypothesis as the outcome-filer hypothesis: 
the strength of the investigation effect under this hypothesis reflects the fear of 
retroactive duty imposition in the event of an affirmative final determination at 
the end of the investigation process, and therefore ought to reflect the likeli- 
hood that the final outcome will be a finding of dumping. 
It is also possible that there are investigation  effects that do not reflect a 
significant probability of retroactive duty imposition at the end of the investiga- 
tion process, but reflect the effects of the investigation process itself. This em- 
bodies  the process-filer  hypothesis.  In  an  earlier paper  (Staiger and Wolak 
1991) we presented a model in which domestic firms make strategic use of the 
ongoing antidumping investigation of the pricing and sales practices of foreign 
firms to prevent the occurrence of price wars which might otherwise be trig- 
gered by periods  of  slack demand  and  low capacity  utilization.  Our theory 
suggests that domestic firms may value the competition-dampening effects of 
an ongoing antidumping investigation for its own sake, and may file such peti- 
tions when capacity utilization is low with no expectation that they would actu- 
ally result in duties or other remedies. In Staiger and Wolak (1994)  we referred 
to such filers as process filers, and noted  that (1) the  act of  filing ought to 
have an immediate trade-dampening effect which lasts for the duration of the 
investigation, distinguishing the investigation effects under process filers from 
those under outcome filers; and that (2) process filers ought to file antidumping 
petitions on the basis of low capacity utilization and little else, and in particular 
should not be concerned with measures important for the final determination 
of dumping, thus distinguishing the filing behavior under process filers from 
that of outcome filers. 
The Suspension Effect 
Turning to the suspension effect, a second way  in which antidumping law 
may restrict trade through nonduty channels is through the effects of so-called 
suspension  agreements,  under  which  antidumping  investigations  are  sus- 
pended by the Commerce Department in exchange for an explicit agreement 
by foreign firms named in the antidumping petition to eliminate sales in the 
U.S. market  at  less  than  “fair  value.”  Since the  intent  of  a  suspension 
agreement is to provide a nonduty alternative by which previous dumping ac- 
tivities can be halted, it would be  surprising if there were  not a suspension 
effect in the data. A prominent example involving such a suspension agreement 
(though not falling in our sample period) was the  1986 U.S.-Japan  Semicon- 
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The Withdrawal Effect 
Finally, a third way  in which  antidumping law may restrict  trade through 
nonduty channels concerns the withdrawal effe~t.~  That is, the imposition of 
antidumping duties or the negotiation of a suspension agreement need not be 
the only outcomes of an antidumping petition for which postinvestigation re- 
lief from imports is secured. In this regard, Prusa (1992) has argued that peti- 
tions which are withdrawn by the domestic industry before a final determina- 
tion can have as restrictive an impact on subsequent trade flows as would be the 
case if  a final determination of dumping had been made and duties imposed. 
Essentially, Prusa argues that domestic firms can use the threat of antidumping 
duties, together with the protection from domestic antitrust laws afforded when 
an antidumping proceeding is in progress, to bargain with foreign firms over 
domestic market share, and that the antidumping petition is withdrawn by the 
domestic industry if and when an acceptable bargain is struck.4 
8.2.2  The Targets of Process Filers 
The logic of  our process-filer  strategy is that domestic firms use the anti- 
dumping investigation process to reduce the temptation of foreign firms to cut 
prices during periods of low capacity utilization. For this strategy to be sensi- 
ble for domestic firms to pursue over our sample period, several conditions 
must  be  met in  the  country  (countries) against which this  filing strategy  is 
being used. First, the firms exporting from each country named in the anti- 
dumping petition should comprise a significant share of the relevant U.S. mar- 
ket, since otherwise the threat posed by these firms to the profitability of U.S. 
firms in the  event of a breakdown in  price discipline is likely  to  be  small. 
Second, the  U.S.  market  share captured  by  the  firms exporting from these 
countries should be relatively stable over the sample period, since otherwise 
the premise of an orderly pricing arrangement, whose breakdown during peri- 
ods of  falling capacity  utilization  can  be  avoided through  the  competition- 
dampening  effects of  antidumping investigations,  would be in  doubt. Third, 
exporters from these countries should be relatively dependent on the U.S. mar- 
ket for their sales, since otherwise demand shifts in the U.S. market which lead 
to falling capacity utilization of U.S. firms might not lead to a significant fall 
in capacity utilization rates for the foreign exporters (and therefore would not 
3. In addition, a number of papers (e.g., Anderson  1992, Staiger and Wolak  1992, and Pmsa 
1988) have suggested thai the mere existcnce of antidumping law can have trade effects even in 
periods when no petition  is filed. 
4. Agreements between foreign firms and domestic petitioners are permitted under the Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine, which provides exemption from prosecution under U.S. antitrust law. Direct 
conversations between domestic and foreign firms concerning prices or quantities would not be 
protected, so settlements are typically negotiatcd through the Commerce Department (Gary Hor- 
lick, personal communication,  1989). See Prusa (1992) for a detailed analysis of this exemption 
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give rise to a significant temptation on the part of foreign exporters to cut prices 
in the US. market). 
With these three criteria in mind, the countries likely to be targets of process 
filings in the United States during our 1980-85  sample period are those whose 
export production over this period is predominantly destined for the U.S. mar- 
ket and accounts for a relatively large and stable U.S. market share. On this 
basis, we expect that Canada and Mexico would be the most likely targets of 
process filings from U.S. firms during our sample period. 
8.3  The Uses and Impacts of Antidumping Law 
Analyzing the filing behavior against imports from Canada and Mexico as 
well as against imports from four other regional groupings, we find evidence 
in the filing behavior and in the nature of the trade impacts which accompany 
filing to suggest that Canada and Mexico were indeed the most likely targets of 
antidumping petitions filed under the process-filing strategy during our sample 
period. That is, the pattern of filing by U.S. firms against imports from Canada 
and Mexico is primarily predicted by low levels of capacity utilization, and the 
impact of the investigation on trade flows is to reduce the rate of imports during 
the entire period of investigation. The regions against which the filing strategy 
of U.S. firms and the nature of the associated trade impacts seem most consis- 
tent with  our outcome-filing view  of  antidumping  suit  activity  are Western 
Europe and the region composed of Japan and the newly industrialized coun- 
tries (NICs) of  East Asia. That is, the pattern  of  filing by U.S. firms against 
imports from these regions is predicted by  a broader set of  variables  which 
enter into the final determination of dumping, and the impact of  the investiga- 
tion on trade flows is to reduce the rate of imports only at the point of a prelimi- 
nary LTFV determination. 
As for the differing effects of  investigation outcomes on postinvestigation 
imports and domestic output, our parameter estimates imply that the imposi- 
tion of antidumping duties against any region strongly reduces imports of the 
products involved, while the response of  domestic import-competing  output 
is positive but less precisely  estimated. Petitions against a region  which are 
subsequently withdrawn appear to have no lasting effects on imports or domes- 
tic output, confirming our earlier findings (Staiger and Wolak 1994). Finally, 
the paucity of suspension agreements in our sample makes it difficult to assess 
regional differences in their impacts on postinvestigation imports and domestic 
output (the Japan-NICs region, for example, did not negotiate any suspension 
agreements with the United States during our sample period). 
We can use our estimates to provide a rough idea of the magnitudes of  all 
the trade-distorting effects, by region and by type of effect, that are associated 
with the use of antidumping law during our sample period. For our sample of 
industries and for the six years of available data, the total amount of U.S. im- 
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of approximately  -0.05  percent of  total (multilateral) U.S. imports over the 
sample period, while the total distortions attributable to postinvestigation ef- 
fects against Western Europe is -  1.14 percent of total imports over the sample 
period. For Japan and the NICs, the distortions to U.S. imports from investiga- 
tion and postinvestigation effects from petitions against this region amounts to 
0.87 percent and -2.31  percent, respectively, of total U.S.  import^.^ For both 
these  regions, the  major import distortions  associated with  the use of  anti- 
dumping law are attributable to postinvestigation effects. For Mexico and Can- 
ada, on the other hand, the relative importance of investigation and postinvesti- 
gation  effects  is  reversed:  the  distortions  to U.S. imports  associated  with 
investigation  and  postinvestigation  effects  of  petitions  against  Mexico  and 
Canada are -0.84  percent and  -0.25  percent, respectively, of total U.S. im- 
ports. This conforms to our findings that U.S. firms appear to be outcome filers 
against Europe and Japan and the NICs, and hence the main import restrictions 
come with the explicit remedies provided  by  the law  (duties  or suspension 
agreements), while U.S. firms appear to be process filers against Mexico and 
Canada, and hence the main import restrictions come from the investigation 
effects. 
A final implication of  our process-filer/outcome-filer distinction is that the 
frequency with which outcome filers ought to secure duties should be substan- 
tially higher than for process filers. To investigate this hypothesis we computed 
the  per-suit  level  of  duty  activity  against  Mexico  and  Canada,  the  region 
against which US.  firms appear to be process  filers. We  then  repeated this 
same calculation for Europe and Japan and the NICs, treating this as the aggre- 
gate region against which U.S.  firms appear to be outcome filers. Dividing the 
“outcome filer ratio” by the “process filer ratio” yields 3.73, suggesting that in 
our sample, a product-level antidumping petition is 3.73 times more likely to 
end in duties when it is filed against firms in Europe, Japan, or the NICs than 
when it is filed against firms from Canada or Mexico. This result is consistent 
with the view that suits against Canada and Mexico are filed less for the even- 
tual protection provided by duties than are suits against Europe and Japan and 
the NICs. 
8.4  Conclusion 
Our cross-country analysis of the determinants and impacts of antidumping 
suits has revealed a substantial amount of  heterogeneity  among the different 
trading regions. Against Western Europe and Japan and the NICs, the use of 
antidumping law appears to be consistent with the view that firms file in expec- 
tation of obtaining relief via antidumping duties or suspension agreements- 
5. The positive boost to U.S.  imports associated with investigation effects of petitions against 
Japan and the NICs reflects the fact that the effect of  filing on imports is positive and relatively 
large and that the effect of an affirmative preliminary LTFV  determination, while negative, does 
not persist long enough to reverse this cumulative positive effect. 93  Import Source and Antidumping Suit Activity 
outcome filers in our nomenclature. This is suggested by the pattern of filing 
against these regions, which appears to reflect a concern for meeting the injury 
requirements necessary to secure a finding of dumping, as well as by the im- 
port and domestic output responses to filing and the various phases of the suit 
resolution process. But we have also argued that a distinctive filing strategy 
against Canada and Mexico would be expected on a priori grounds, and in 
particular that Canada and Mexico are the most likely targets of process filing 
by US.  firms during our sample period because their export production is pre- 
dominantly destined for the US.  market and accounts for a relatively high and 
stable U.S.  market share. We find evidence in the use  of  antidumping law 
against Mexico and Canada which is consistent with our process-filer logic, 
where firms file primarily to obtain the protection afforded during the investi- 
gation process itself. This is supported by  the pattern of filing against these 
countries, which appears to be driven primarily by the level of capacity utiliza- 
tion but is unrelated to other observable measures of injury, as well as by the 
import and domestic output responses to filing and the various phases of the 
suit resolution process. 
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